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Abstract
In this paper, the impact of false information injection is investigated for linear dynamic systems with
multiple sensors. It is assumed that the system is unsuspecting the existence of false information and the
adversary is trying to maximize the negative effect of the false information on Kalman filter’s estimation
performance. The false information attack under different conditions is mathematically characterized.
For the adversary, many closed-form results for the optimal attack strategies that maximize Kalman
filter’s estimation error are theoretically derived. It is shown that by choosing the optimal correlation
coefficients among the bias noises and allocating power optimally among sensors, the adversary could
significantly increase Kalman filter’s estimation errors. To be concrete, a target tracking system is
used as an example in the paper. From the adversary’s point of view, the best attack strategies are
obtained under different scenarios, including a single-sensor system with both position and velocity
measurements, and a multi-sensor system with position and velocity measurements. Under a constraint
on the total power of the injected bias noises, the optimal solutions are solved from two perspectives:
trace and determinant. Numerical results are also provided in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the
proposed attack strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
System state estimation in the presence of an adversary that injects false information into
sensor readings has attracted much attention in wide application areas, such as target tracking
with compromised sensors, secure monitoring of dynamic electric power systems and radar
tracking and detection in the presence of jammers [1]. This topic has been studied in [2]–[9]. In
[2], the problem of taking advantage of the power system configuration to introduce arbitrary
bias to the system without being detected was investigated and inspired many researchers further
study false information injection along this direction. [3] shows the impact of malicious attacks
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2on real-time electricity market concerning the locational marginal price and how the attackers
can make profit by manipulating certain values of the measurements. Some certain strategies are
also provied to find the optimal single attack vector. The relationship between the attackers and
the control center was discussed in [4], where both the adversary’s attacking strategies and the
control center’s detection algorithms have been proposed. Refer to [5] and [6] for more about
false information attacks on the electricity market. Inspired by [2], the data frame attack in which
deleting the comprised sensors the defender system detects will make the system unobservable
was formulated as a quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) in [7]. In [8], [9], the
relation between a target and a MIMO radar was characterized as a two-person zero-sum game.
However, in the aforementioned publications, only the problem of static system state estimation
has been considered.
In this paper, for a linear dynamic system, we analyze the impact of the injected false
information on Kalman filter’s state estimation performance over time, which has not got much
attention in the literature. Some related publications exist on sensor management [10]–[12],
where the problem of arranging the sensors to minimize the covariance of the state estimation
error so that a more accurate state estimate can be obtained is investigated. This problem is
clearly opposite to the problem we study in the paper, where the goal for the adversary is to
maximize the mean square state estimation error matrix, and to confuse Kalman filter. In [13],
the problem of sensor bias estimation and compensation for target tracking has been addressed.
Interested readers are referred to [13] and the references therein for details.
In [14], we have studied the impact of the injected biases on a Kalman filter’s estimation
performance, showing that if the false information is injected at a single time, its impact converges
to zero as time goes on; if the false information is injected into the system continuously, the
estimation error tends to reach a steady state. In [15], we have found the best strategies for
the adversary to attack Kalman filter system from the perspective of the trace of the mean
squared error (MSE) matrix, and obtained some close-form results. Also in [16], based on the
previous work, the problem is further refined regarding the determinant of MSE matrix, which
the correlation among the elements is taken into consideration. In [17], [18], the Kalman filter
system has been investigated regarding the system robustness in the case where sensor reading is
continuously jammed by the false information using Greedy search and dynamic programming.
However, the it is of great challenge to find the closed form solution in term of determinant of the
MSE matrix and optimal solution to the case in which the Kalman filter system is compromised
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3by the false information continuously. Considering the problems mentioned above, in this paper,
our goal is to find the closed form optimal attack strategy for the adversary, which maximizes the
impact of the false information injection on Kalman filter’s state estimation from the determinant
perspective. By adopting the objective function as the determinant of the MSE matrix, we change
the problem significantly. As shown later in the paper, the optimal attack strategy that maximizes
the determinant of the MSE matrix is a function of Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance
and hence ”adaptive” to Kalman filter; whereas that maximizing the trace of the MSE matrix
is not a function of Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance. Previous works concentrated
more on the situation where the adversary attacks the system by a single shot. In this paper, the
problem of continuous attack is also investigated.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II generally describes the discrete-time
linear dynamic system. Section III mathematically characterizes the impact of determined or
random false information on Kalman filter’s system. Section IV and V analyze how to get
the best strategy to attack Kalman filter’s system from trace and determinant cases standing
from the perspective of the adversary. Under the constraint on the adversary’s total sensor bias
noise power, different strategies are proposed to maximize Kalman filter’s mean squared state
estimation error for different scenarios. Section VI provides the simulation results and Section
VII concludes the paper.
II. KALMAN FILTER SYSTEM
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The discrete-time linear dynamic system can be described as below,
xk+1 = Fkxk +Gkuk + vk (1)
where Fk is the system state transition matrix, xk is the system state vector at time k, uk is a
known input vector, Gk is the input gain matrix, and vk is a zero-mean white Gaussian process
noise with covariance matrix E[vkv
T
k ] = Qk. Let us assume that M sensors are used by the
linear system. The measurement at time k collected by sensor i is
zk,i = Hk,ixk,i +wk,i (2)
with Hk,i being the measurement matrix, and wk,i a zero-mean white Gaussian measurement
noise with covariance matrix E[wk,iw
T
k,i] = Rk,i, for i = 1, · · · ,M . We further assume that
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4the measurement noises are independent across sensors. The matrices Fk, Gk, Hk,i, Qk, and
Rk,i are assumed to be known with proper dimensions. In this paper, we assume that a bias
bk,i is injected by the adversary into the measurement of the ith sensor at time k intentionally.
Therefore, the measurement equation (2) becomes
z′k,i = Hk,ixk +wk,i + bk,i = zk,i + bk,i (3)
where z′k,i is the corrupted measurement, bk,i is either an unknown constant or a random variable
independent of {vk,i} and {wk,i}.
For compactness, let us denote the system sensor observation as zk = [z
T
k1, · · · , z
T
kM ]
T , which
contains the observations from all the M sensors. Similarly, let us denote the system bias vector
as bk = [b
T
k1, · · · ,b
T
kM ]
T which includes the biases at all the M sensors. Correspondingly, the
measurement matrix becomes
Hk = [H
T
k1, · · · ,H
T
kM ]
T (4)
With these notations, it is easy to convert (2) and (3) into the following equations respectively.
zk = Hkxk +wk (5)
and
z′k = zk + bk (6)
Further, we have the measurement error covariance matrix corresponding to wk is
Rk =


Rk,1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · Rk,M

 (7)
which is obtained by using the assumption that measurement noises are independent across
sensors.
IV. IMPACT OF FALSE INFORMATION INJECTION
In this paper, let us assume that the adversary attacks the system by injecting false information
into the sensors while unaware of such attacks. We start with the case where biases (bk) are
continuously injected into the system starting from a certain time K. Note that single injection
is just a special case of continuous injection when bk are set to be nonzero at time K and zero
otherwise.
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5In the continuous injection case, Kalman filter’ extra state estimation error, which is caused
by the continuous bias injection alone, is derived in [19] and provided as follows.
Proposition 1. Kalman filter’s state estimation error at time K +N is
xˆ′K+N |K+N − xK+N = xˆK+N |K+N − xK+N
+
N∑
m=0
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbK+N−m (8)
where xˆ′K+N |K+N is Kalman filter’s state estimate in the presence of the bias sequence {bk},
xˆK+N |K+N is Kalman filter’s state estimate in the absence of the bias,
BK , (I−WKHK)FK−1, (9)
I is the identity matrix, and WK is Kalman filter gain [20] at time K. As a result, the extra
state estimation error at time K + N due to the continuous bias bk injected at and after time
K is
N∑
m=0
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbK+N−m, (10)
If {bk} is a zero-mean, random, and independent sequence, the extra mean squared error
(EMSE) at a particular time instant K + N due to the bias alone is provided in the following
proposition. Using the results from Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 2 is provided as well.
Proposition 2. When the bias sequence {bk} is zero mean, random, and independent over time,
the EMSE at time K +N due to the biases injected at and after time K, denoted as AK+N ,
is
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m (11)
where
Dm =
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−m (12)
∏−1
i=0BK+N−i = I is an identity matrix, and ΣK+N−m is the covariance matrix of bK+N−m.
Proof Sketches: Let us denote x˜K+N |K+N = xˆK+N |K+N − xK+N as Kalman filter’s state esti-
mation error in the absence of any false information, and
am =
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbk+N−m (13)
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6From (8), we can get
AK+N
= E

(x˜K+N |K+N + N∑
m=0
am
)(
x˜K+N |K+N +
N∑
n=0
an
)T
− E
(
x˜K+N |K+N x˜
T
K+N |K+N
)
= E
(
x˜K+N |K+N
N∑
n=0
aTn
)
+ E
(
N∑
m=0
amx˜
T
K+N |K+N
)
+ E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
= E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
where the last line is due to the fact that am and an have zero mean, are independent from each
other when m 6= n, and are independent from x˜K+N |K+N . Using this fact again, we further have
E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
= E
(
N∑
m=0
ama
T
m
)
(14)
=
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m
where Dm has been defined in Proposition 2.
V. THE OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGY
1) Problem Formulation for a General Linear System : In this paper, we investigate the
optimal attack strategy that an adversary can adopt to maximize the system estimator’s estimation
error. This problem can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem. Without loss of
generality, let us consider that the attacker is interested in maximizing the system state estimation
error at time K right after a single false bias is injected at time K. In this case, we are interested
in designing the injected random bias’ covariance matrix such that
max
ΣK
Tr
[
PK|K +AK(ΣK)
]
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (15)
where a is a constant, Tr(·) is the matrix trace operator, and PK|K is Kalman filter’s state
estimation error covariance matrix at time K in the absence of any false information. Note that
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7it is meaningful to have a constraint on the trace of ΣK , since it can be deemed as the power of
injected sensor bias bK , and a smaller power for bK reduces the probability that the adversary is
detected by the system estimator using an innovation based detector. Note that the optimization
problem is equivalent to one that maximizes Tr (AK(ΣK)), since PK|K is not a function of ΣK ,
and trace is a linear operator. If one is more interested in the determinant of the estimation MSE
matrix, a similar optimization problem can be easily formulated as follows.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K +AK(ΣK)∣∣
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (16)
2) Equivalent Measurement in Multi-Sensor Systems: To simplify the mathematical analysis,
it is helpful to derive the equivalent sensor measurement, which is a linear combination of the
observations from all the sensors, and is a sufficient statistic containing all the information about
the systems state. The equivalent sensor measurement vector and its corresponding covariance
matrix should have much smaller dimension than the original measurement vector and its
covariance, making the mathematical manipulation and derivation later in the paper much simpler.
In a information filter recursion [20], which is equivalent to Kalman filter recursion, we have
yˆk|k = yˆk|k−1 +H
T
kR
−1
k zk (17)
where yˆk|k = P
−1
k|kxk|k and yˆk|k−1 = P
−1
k|k−1xk|k−1. It is clear that yˆk|k−1 represents the prior
knowledge about the system state based on past sensor data, and the second term in (17)
represents the new information from the new sensor data zk, which can be expanded by using
(4) and (7) as follows.
HTkR
−1
k zk
= [HTk1, · · · ,H
T
kM ]


R−1k1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · R−1kM




zk1
...
zkM


=
M∑
i=1
HTkiR
−1
ki zki
(18)
In the following derivations, we skip the time index k for simplicity. Our purpose is to find an
equivalent measurement ze such that
ze = Hex+we (19)
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8where we ∼ N (0,Re), and
HTeR
−1
e ze =
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (20)
Let us consider two cases. First, suppose all the His are the same (Hi = H) , then it is natural
to set He = H. Note that a sufficient condition for (20) to be true is
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi (21)
Taking the covariance on the both sides of (21), we get
Re = Recov
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi
)
RTe
= Re
[
M∑
i=1
R−1i Ri(R
−1
i )
T
]
RTe
(22)
This implies that
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i
)−1
(23)
In the second case, let us assume that the system state x is observable based on the observations
from all the sensors, meaning that the Fisher information matrix
∑M
i=1H
T
i R
−1
i Hi is invertible.
In this case, by setting He = I, using (20), and following a similar procedure as in the first case,
we have
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (24)
and
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i Hi
)−1
(25)
VI. A TARGET TRACKING EXAMPLE
In this paper, we give a concrete target tracking example. We assume that the target moves in
a 1-dimensional space according to a discrete white noise acceleration model [20], which can
still be described by the plant and measurement equations given in (1) and (2). In such a system,
the state is defined as xk = [ξk ξ˙k]
T , where ξk and ξ˙k denote the target’s position and velocity
at time k respectively. The input uk is a zero sequence. The state transition matrix is
F =

 1 T
0 1

 (26)
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9where T is the time between measurements. The process noise is vk = Γvk, where vk is a
zero mean white acceleration noise, with variance σ2v , and the vector gain multiplying the scalar
process noise is given by ΓT = [T 2/2 T ]. The covariance matrix of the process noise is therefore
Q = σ2vΓΓ
T .
In this paper, we investigate the attack strategies for two scenarios. In the first scenario, only
position measurements are available to the sensors, whereas in the second scenario, the sensors
measure both position and velocity of the target.
A. Attack Strageties Analysis From Trace perspective
1) Attack Strategy For Multiple Position Sensors: In this case, it is assumed that at each
sensor, only the position measurement is available, so that Hi = [1 0]. At each sensor, the
measurement noise process is zero-mean, white, and with variance, σ2wi . In order to simplify
the problem, we think of zek as the equivalent measurement, which is a linear combination of
the measurements from all the sensors. Using the results we derived in Section V-2 for the first
case, namely (21) and (23), the measurement equation (3) becomes
z′k = zek + bek (27)
where
zek =
M∑
m=0
cizki (28)
bek =
M∑
m=0
cibki (29)
and
ci =
1/σ2wi∑M
j=1
(
1/σ2wj
) (30)
which is the corresponding coefficient/weight for the ith sensor. In this target tracking problem,
let us first consider the strategy that maximizes the trace of the Kalamn filter estimation error,
which is the solution of (15) in Section V-1. In this case,
ΣK =


σ2b1 ρ12σb1σb2 · · · ρ1Mσb1σbM
ρ12σb1σb2 σ
2
b2
· · · ρ2Mσb2σbM
...
...
. . .
...
ρ1Mσb1σbM ρ2Mσb2σbM · · · σ
2
bM

 (31)
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where σ2bi is the variance of the random bias injected at the ith sensor (bi), and ρij is the
correlation coefficient between bi and bj . Therefore, (15) is equivalent to
maxTr [AK ]
s.t.
M∑
i=1
σ2bi = a
2
−1 ≤ ρij ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M (32)
To simplify this problem, we first use the equivalent measurement to convert the multi-sensor
problem to a single sensor problem. Namely, in Proposition 2 by replacing
Hk =


1 0
...
...
1 0


with He = [1 0], and replacing ΣK with
ΣeK = E[b
2
eK
] (33)
= E

( M∑
i=1
cibi
)2
=
M∑
i=1
c2iσ
2
bi
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
2ρijcicjσbiσbj
we can easily show that AK = D0ΣeKD
T
0 . Since ΣeK is a scalar and D0 is not a function of
ΣK , maximizing the trace of AK is equivalent to maximizing ΣeK .
First, let us consider the case where the random biases at different sensors are independent,
meaning that ρi,j = 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M . The optimal strategy for the adversary in this case is
clearly to put all the bias power to the sensor with the largest coefficient ci:
Proposition 3. For a system with M sensors, if the adversary injects independent random noises,
the best strategy is to allocate all the power to the sensor with smallest noise variance.
Next, let us consider the more general case where the random biases are dependent. By
inspecting (33), it is clear that to maximize ΣeK , we need to set all the ρijs to 1. As a result,
(33) becomes
ΣeK =
(
M∑
i=1
ciσbi
)2
(34)
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Now, the optimization problem in (32) has been converted to the following problem:
max
(
M∑
i=1
ciσbi
)2
s.t.
M∑
i=1
σ2bi = a
2 (35)
The above problem can be solved by using standard constrained optimization techniques [21]
based on gradient and Hessian, which are rather involved. Here we solve the problem using a
much simpler geometric solution, which has been shown to give the same solution as that by
the standard optimization techniques. We start with the simplest case with two sensors, in which
we need to solve the following optimization problem.
max c1σb1 + c2σb2 (36)
s.t. σ2b1 + σ
2
b2
= a2
We can get the optimal solution by analyzing the problem geometrically with the norm vector
(c1, c2)
T of the objective function as shown in the Fig. 1. The constraint of the problem is
represented by the circle with a radius of a. We move the line l1 with the slope −
c1
c2
to get
the largest intercept between l1 and σ2 axis under the constraint that there is an intersection
between the circle and the line l1. The corresponding optimal solution is found when l1 becomes
a tangent line to the circle, which is
σ1 =
c1a√
c21 + c
2
2
σ2 =
c2a√
c21 + c
2
2
(37)
For a system with arbitrary number of sensors, we can repeat the same procedure to find the
optimal solution by using hyperplanes and hyperspheres. In general, the optimal attack strategy
can be found and summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. For a system with M sensors, the optimal strategy for the adversary is to inject
dependent random noises with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 1. The random bias power
is allocated such that
σbi =
cia√∑M
j=1 c
2
j
, for i = 1, · · · ,M. (38)
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Fig. 1. Geometric solution for systems with two sensors.
2) Attack Strategy For A Single Position And Velocity Sensor: In this case, let us assume
that the sensors collect both position and velocity measurements of the target. Therefore, the
measurement matrix for the ith sensor is Hi = I2, where I2 is a 2 × 2 identity matrix. At the
ith sensor, the adversary injects the bias noise vector bki to the sensor measurement zki , where
bki = [bpi bvi ]
T consists biases in position and velocity measurements. Let us assume that the
system bias vector bk = [b
T
k1, · · · ,b
T
kM ]
T is zero-mean and has a 2M × 2M covariance matrix
ΣK . Further, the (i, j)th 2× 2 submatrix for ΣK is defined as
ΣK(i, j) =

 ρbpi,bpjσbpiσbpj ρbpi,bvjσbpiσbvj
ρbvi,bpjσbviσbpj ρbvi,bvjσbviσbvj

 (39)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M . σbpi and σbvi are the position and velocity bias noise standard deviations
at the ith sensor respectively. The ρs are defined as the proper correlation coefficients between
components of the bias vector, and ρbpi,bpi = ρbvi,bvi = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ M . Since the position
bias bp and velocity bias bv have different units, we need an appropriate constraint for bias noise
power. Here we assume that the total noise power is defined as
M∑
i=1
σ2bpi + T
2σ2bvi (40)
Note that this is a meaningful power definition, since the two terms in the above equation has
the same unit. Recall that according to the target tracking system plant equation and ignoring
the system process noise, we have ξk+1 = ξk+T ξ˙k. Therefore, the power defined in (40) can be
interpreted as the summation of the extra mean squared errors for the position estimate caused
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by independent bias injections. We can see that the best attack strategy derived under a constraint
on power defined in (40) can be easily adjusted and extended for other power definitions, as
long as in the new definition, the second term is proportional to T 2σ2bvi
.
As we can use the equivalent sensor to represent the multiple sensors, we focus on the single-
sensor case first. If we are interested in the case of N = 0, maximizing the trace of AK
is equivalent to maximize the WKΣKW
T
K . We assume that the adversary knows the system
models and the prior information P0|0 at time zero, so that he/she can calculate the offline
Kalman filter gain matrix Wk recursively. Therefore, the best strategy the adversary can adopt
to attack the system is the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
ΣK
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0 (41)
where
ΣK =

 σ2bp ρbp,bvσbpσbv
ρbp,bvσbpσbv σ
2
bv

 (42)
and
WK =

 w11 w12
w21 w22

 (43)
It is easy to show that
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= Tr
[
WTKWKΣK
]
= (w211 + w
2
21)σ
2
bp + (w
2
12 + w
2
22)σ
2
bv
+ 2(w11w12 + w21w22)ρbp,bvσbpσbv
(44)
According to the sign of (w11w12 + w21w22), we can set the value of the ρbp,bv to maximize
the objective function. For example, if (w11w12 + w21w22) is positive, we set ρbp,bv = 1 and the
optimization problem becomes
max(w11σbp + w12σbv)
2 + (w21σbp + w22σbv)
2
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (45)
σbp , σbv ≥ 0
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To solve this constrained optimization problem, let us first denote
w211 + w
2
21 = β1
w212 + w
2
22 = β2
w11w12 = α1
w21w22 = α2
(46)
The constraint in (41) can be written as
σ2bp
T 2
+ σ2bv =
a2
T 2
= a21 (47)
Now we set σbp = a1T sin(θ) and σbv = a1 cos(θ). Plugging σbp and σbv into the objective
function, we have the following equivalent optimization problem
max
θ
a21
[
β1T
2
1 + β2
2
+ A sin(2θ + φ)
]
s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤
pi
2
(48)
where
A =
√
1
4
(β2 − β1T 2)
2 + T 2(α1 + α2)2 (49)
tan(φ) =
β2 − β1T
2
2T (α1 + α2)
(50)
Clearly, the optimal solution is
θ∗ =
pi
4
−
φ
2
(51)
We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For a system with one sensor observing position and velocity of the target, the
optimal strategy for the adversary is to inject random noise that has dependent position and
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velocity components. If w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, the correlation coefficient ρbp,bv should be set as
1, and the random bias power is allocated such that
σbp = a sin(θ
∗) (52)
σbv =
a
T
cos(θ∗)
θ∗ =
pi
4
−
φ
2
φ = arctan
[
β2 − β1T
2
2T (α1 + α2)
]
w211 + w
2
21 = β1
w212 + w
2
22 = β2
w11w12 = α1
w21w22 = α2
When w11w12+w21w22 < 0, we should set ρbp,bv = −1 and set α1 = −w11w12 and α2 = −w21w22.
The rest of the equations in formula (52) remains the same.
3) Attack Strategy For Multiple Position And Velocity Senors: In this case, M = 2, and the
measurement matrix is H = [I2 I2]
T . The measurement covariance matrix for the ith sensor is
assumed to be
Ri =

 σ2pi 0
0 σ2vi

 (53)
Now, according to (25), we have
Re = [R
−1
1 +R
−1
2 ]
−1
=

 (σ−2p1 + σ−2p2 )−1 0
0
(
σ−2v1 + σ
−2
v2
)−1

 (54)
According to (24), we define
Ci = ReH
T
i R
−1
i
=

 σ
−2
pi
σ−2p1 +σ
−2
p2
0
0
σ−2vi
σ−2v1 +σ
−2
v2

 (55)
as the weighting matrix for the ith sensor’s observation zi. Further, we define
cpi = Ci(1, 1)
cvi = Ci(2, 2)
(56)
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both of which are positive numbers. The equivalent noise injection is therefore
beK =
2∑
i=1
CibKi (57)
So the covariance matrix of the equivalent bias vector is
ΣeK =
2∑
i=1
2∑
i=j
CiΣK(i, j)C
T
j (58)
where ΣK(i, j) has been defined in (39). It can be shown that
ΣeK =

 s1 s2
s2 s3

 (59)
Where
s1 = c
2
p1
σ2bp1 + c
2
p2
σ2bp2 + 2ρbp1 ,bp2cp1cp2σbp1σbp2
s3 = c
2
v1σ
2
bv1
+ c2v2σ
2
bv2
+ 2ρbv1 ,bv2cv1cv2σbv1σbv2
(60)
s2 = cp1cv1ρbp1 ,bv1σbp1σbv1 + cp1cv2ρbp1 ,bv2σbp1σbv2
+ cp2cv1ρbp2 ,bv1σbp2σbv1 + cp2cv2ρbp2 ,bv2σbp2σbv2
(61)
The optimization problem can be written as follows.
max
ΣeK
Tr
[
WeKΣeKW
T
eK
]
(62)
s.t. σ2bp1 + σ
2
bp2
+ T 2σ2bv1 + T
2σ2bv2 = a
2,
−1 ≤ ρpi,vj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρvi,vj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρpi,pj ≤ 1,
σpi, σvi ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}
where
WeK =

 w11 w12
w21 w22

 (63)
is Kalman filter gain calculated using the equivalent measurement covariance matrix Re and
equivalent measurement matrix He. It is easy to show that
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= Tr
[
WTKWKΣK
]
(64)
= (w211 + w
2
21)
2s1 + (w
2
12 + w
2
22)
2s3
+2(w11w12 + w21w22)s2
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Clearly, all the ρs that appear in s1 and s3 should be set as 1 to maximize the objective function.
The optimal values for ρs in s2 depend on Kalman filter gain WeK . More specifically, when
w11w12 +w21w22 > 0, all the ρs that appear in s2 should be set to 1; otherwise, they should be
set as −1. Let us first suppose that w11w12 + w21w22 > 0 is true, then we have
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= (w211 + w
2
21)
2(cp1σp1 + cp2σp2)
2
+ (w212 + w
2
22)
2(cv1σv1 + cv2σv2)
2
+ 2(w11w12 + w21w22)(cp1cv1σp1σv1 + cp1cv2σp1σv2
+ cp2cv1σp2σv1 + cp2cv2σp2σv2)
(65)
So far, we have converted the objective function in (62), which involves 10 variables to one
that involves only 4 variables. Considering that the power constraint reduces one degree of
freedom, we only need to solve an optimization problem in a 3-dimensional space.
4) Strategy For A Single Sensor With Multiple Time Attack: Based on Proposition 2, we get
the extra mean square matrix,
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m
Suppose at the time K, the adversary wants to attack the system continuously from time K to
K +N , the weight for different time is αi, i ∈ N , as shown below,
A
′
K+0 = α0(D0ΣKD
T
0 )
A
′
K+1 = α1(D0ΣK+1D
T
0 +D1ΣKD
T
1 ) (66)
...
A
′
K+N = αN(D0ΣK+ND
T
0 + ... +DNΣKD
T
N)
where
∑N
m=0 αm = 1. So the objective function in the multi-shot attack case is the trace of
the weighted sum of the EMSE matrices at different time points that is
∑N
m=0 αmAK+m =∑N
m=0A
′
K+m. It is equivalent to maximize the trace of the weighted sum of the MSE matrices
of the state estimates, because once the system reaches its steady state, PK+m|K+m becomes
constant, and the weighted sum of PK+m|K+m will remain the same. First we study the case
where the system has position sensors which are being attacked, so all the items above are
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scalars. Using lower case d, σ2p to denote D,Σ, we can formulate the optimization problem
below,
max
σpK ,··· ,σpK+N
N∑
m=0
αmAK+m =
N∑
m=0
A
′
K+m (67)
= σ2pK (α0d
2
0 + α1d
2
1 + ... + αNd
2
N)
+σ2pK+1(α1d
2
0 + α2d
2
1 + ...+ αNd
2
N−1)
+σ2pK+2(α2d
2
0 + α3d
2
1 + ...+ αNd
2
N−2)
+...
+σ2pK+N (αNd
2
0)
s.t.
K+N∑
m=K
σ2pm ≤ a
2
N∑
m=0
αm = 1
The adversary can allocate the power based on the coefficients of the variance variables at
different time. For example, if the weights α′ms are all the same, the best strategy is to allocate
all the power to the sensors at the first beginning (at time K) because the coefficient for σ2pK is
the largest. Second, if the sensors measure both position and velocity, and the attacker aims to
attack the system with position and velocity false information, the optimization problem can be
characterized as below,
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max
ΣK ,··· ,ΣK+N
Tr
[
N∑
m=0
αmAK+m
]
= Tr
[
N∑
m=0
A
′
K+m
]
(68)
= Tr
[
ΣK(α0D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
NDN)
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+1(α1D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−1DN−1)
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+2(α2D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−2DN−2)
]
+...
+Tr
[
ΣK+N(αND
T
0D0)
]
s.t.
K+N∑
m=K
σ2pm + T
2σ2vm ≤ a
2
N∑
m=0
αm = 1
where Σm and D
T
j Dj are positive semidefinite matrices, so Tr
[
Σm(D
T
j Dj)
]
≥ 0 all the time.
The trace function Tr(·) is a monotonically increasing function of the positive semidefinite
matrix. So the best strategy for the adversary to attack the system is to put all the power at the
time with the largest positive semidefinite matrix.
B. Attack Strategies from Determinant Perspective
1) Attack Strategy For Multiple Position Sensors: We are also interested in the effect of bias
information on Kalman filter’s estimation MSE from the determinant perspective. By using the
equivalent measurement approach as in Section VI-A1, we have
|PK|K +AK | = |PK|K + ΣeKD0D
T
0 |
= |PK|K||I+ ΣeKD0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 |
(69)
where D0 is defined in Proposition ??. ΣeK is defined in (33). As PK|K is constant and positive
definite, D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 is positive semidefinite meaning that all the eigenvalues of the D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0
are non-negative. First, let us denote C as a square matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors
of D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 . Then through eigendecomposition, (69) can be written concisely as,
|PK|K||CIC
−1 + ΣeKCΛC
−1|
= |PK|K||I+ ΣeKΛ|
(70)
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where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of the D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 .
So we just need to maximize ΣeK in order to maximize the determinant of PK|K +AK . This
is equivalent to maximizing the trace of PK|K +AK as discussed in Section VI-A1.
2) Attack Strategy For A Single Position And Velocity Sensor: We assume that the adversary
knows the system model and the prior information P0|0 at time zero, so that he/she can calculate
the offline Kalman filter gain matrix Wk recursively. The best attack strategy is the solution to
the following optimization problem.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K +WKΣKWTK∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (71)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
where WKΣKW
T
K = AK , and
ΣK =

 σ2bp ρbp,bvσbpσbv
ρbp,bvσbpσbv σ
2
bv

 (72)
Using the properties of the determinant, we get the formula as follows.
|PK|K +WKΣKW
T
K |
= |PK|K||In +ΣKW
T
KP
−1
K|KWK | (73)
Since PK|K is independent of ΣK , the optimization problem can be further written as:
max
ΣK
∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (74)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
By defining
WTKP
−1
K|KWK =

 m1 m2
m2 m3

 (75)
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and after simplifying (74), the objective function becomes∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
= 1 + (1− ρ2bp,bv)σ
2
bpσ
2
bv(m1m3 −m
2
2) (76)
+σ2bpm1 + σ
2
bvm3 + 2ρbp,bvσbpσbvm2
The optimal solution to the problem will be the best strategy to attack the system.
We denote ΣK = R
TR and since ΣK is invertible, we have∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣In +RTRWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (77)
=
∣∣∣In +RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣
In order to obtain the optimal solution, two useful lemmas [22] are introduced as follows,
Lemma 1. Suppose A and B are n× n positive semidefinite matrices with eigendecomposition
A = ΨAΣAΨ
T
A
and B = ΨBΣBΨ
T
B
, the eigenvalues of A and B satisfy that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥
αn and β1 ≥ β2 ≥ · · · ≥ βn, then
Πni=1(αi + βi) ≤ det(A+B) ≤ Π
n
i=1(αi + βn+1−i) (78)
where the upper bound is achieved if and only if ΨA = ΨBΘ, the lower bound is achieved if
and only if ΨA = ΨB, and Θ is the matrix defined below,

0 0 · · · 1
0 · · · 1 0
...
...
...
...
1 0 · · · 0

 (79)
Readers are referred to [22] for the proof of Lemma 1. The optimal solution to find the upper
bound is the best strategy to attack the system with the most effect on Kalman filter system and
the lower bound is the least attack effect the adversary can get.
Lemma 2. Given a n×n matrix V1 and a n×n positive semidefinite matrix Ξ1 with V1Ξ1VT1
being a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements in increasing order, it is always possible to find
another n×n matrix V¯1 such that V¯1Ξ1V¯T1 = βV1Ξ1V
T
1 with Tr(V1V
T
1 ) = Tr(V¯1V¯
T
1 ) where
β ≥ 1. V¯1 can be written as ΣΞΨT1 , where Ψ1 is the unitary matrix whose columns are the
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eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues of Ξ1 in increasing order, and ΣΞ is a diagonal
matrix.
By combining the two lemmas together, we can get the final optimal solution to the optimiza-
tion problem above. It is obvious that In and RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T are both positive semidefinite
matrices, and their eigendecomposition can be written as follows,
In = Ψ1Σ1Ψ
T
1
RWTKP
−1
K|KWKR
T = Ψ2Σ2Ψ
T
2 (80)
with identity matrix Σ1 = diag([σ1,1, · · · , σ1,n]) and Σ2 = diag([σ2,1, · · · , σ2,n]), where σ2,i, i ∈
{1, · · · , n} is the diagonal element of the matrix Σ2. Based on Lemma 1, we can get,∣∣∣In +RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣ ≤ Πni=1(σ2,i + 1) (81)
where Ψ1 = Ψ2Θ.
|In +RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T |
= |ΨT1 ||In +RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T ||Ψ1| (82)
= |In +Ψ
T
1RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
TΨ1|
Set R1 = Ψ
T
1R and Σ3 = ΘΣ2Θ
T with the eigenvalues of increasing order and Tr(RRT ) =
Tr(R1R
T
1 ). So the optimization problem can be written as below,
max |In +R1W
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T
1 |
s.t. T r(R1R
T
1 ) ≤ a
2 (83)
R1W
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T
1 = Σ3
Setting WTKP
−1
K|KWK = Ξ˜, we have R1Ξ˜R
T
1 = Σ3. Based on Lemma 2, we can surely find a
matrix R¯ such that R¯1Ξ˜R¯
T
1 = βR1Ξ˜R
T
1 , with β ≥ 1. Note that det(·) is a monotonic increasing
function of the positive semidefinite matrix. So
|In +R1Ξ˜R
T
1 | ≤ |In + R¯1Ξ˜R¯
T
1 | (84)
So the optimal solution R¯ should be in the form of V¯. The eigendecompostion of Ξ˜ is as
follows,
Ξ˜ = VΞΣΞV
T
Ξ (85)
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where ΣΞ = diag([σξ,1, σξ,2, · · · , σξ,n]) in increasing order.VΞ is a unitary matrix whose column
vectors corresponds to the eigenvalues of Ξ˜. The problem can be written as
max
σ2
b,i
n∑
i=1
log(σ2b,iσξ,i + 1) (86)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(σ2b,i) ≤ a
2
The objective function above is a concave and increasing function. The optimal solution is
achieved through Lagrangian multipliers yielding the water-filling strategy,
σ2b,i =
(
1
λ
−
1
σξ,i
)+
(87)
where the value of λ can be obtained by solving
n∑
i=1
(
1
λ
−
1
σξ,i
)+
= a2 (88)
The solution is
Ropt = Ψ1[Σ
1/2
b
]TVT
Ξ
(89)
Finally, the optimal solution of (74) is,
ΣK = VΞΣbV
T
Ξ
(90)
3) Attack Strategy For Multiple Position and Velocity Sensors: For a system with multiple
sensors, the best strategy to allocate the bias noise power and set the correlation coefficients
among the bias noises at different sensors is also investigated. Let us denote the number of
sensors as M , and the measurement matrix as H = [I2, · · · , I2]
T . The measurement covariance
matrix for the ith sensor is assumed to be
Ri =

 σ2pi 0
0 σ2vi

 (91)
Now, according to (23), we have
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i
)−1
=


(∑M
i=1 σ
−2
pi
)−1
0
0
(∑M
i=1 σ
−2
vi
)−1


(92)
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According to (21), we define
Ci = ReR
−1
i
=


σ−2pi∑M
j=1 σ
−2
pj
0
0
σ−2vi∑M
j=1 σ
−2
vj

 (93)
as the weighting matrix for the ith sensor’s observation zi.
The equivalent injected bias noise is therefore
beK =
M∑
i=1
CibKi (94)
and the covariance matrix of the equivalent bias vector is
ΣeK =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
CiE(bib
T
j )C
T
j (95)
Now the optimization problem can be formulated as follows.
max
ΣeK
∣∣PK|K +WeKΣeKWTeK∣∣ (96)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
σ2bpi + T
2
N∑
j=1
σ2bvi = a
2,
−1 ≤ ρbpi ,bvj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρbvi ,bvj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρbpi ,bpj ≤ 1,
σbpi , σbvi ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1,M}
whereWeK is Kalman filter gain calculated using He and Re. The optimal solution of (96) can
be obtained numerically as shown later in the paper.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Some numerical results are presented in this section to illustrate the theoretical results.
A. System with Position Sensors
The parameters used in the target tracking example are provided below. The system sampling
interval is T = 1. The adversary injects bias information to two sensors with σ2w1 = 3 and
σ2w2 = 4, respectively. The variance of the system process noise is σ
2
v = 0.25. The biases bis are
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zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances σ2bis. For the power constraint we discussed
earlier, we set the sum of σ2bi to be 3000.
The effect of the bias injection on Kalman filter is measured by a Chi-squared test. More
specifically, we use the sum of the normalized MSE over Nm Monte-Carlo runs
qk =
Nm∑
j=1
[
xˆ
′j
k|k − x
j
k
]T
P−1k|k
[
xˆ
′j
k|k − x
j
k
]
(97)
where at time k, Pk|k is the nominal state covariance matrix calculated by Kalman filter, xˆ
′j
k|k is
the state estimate, and x
j
k is the true state, during the jth Monte-Carlo run. First, if the random
biases injected to different sensors are independent, we should allocate all the bias power to the
sensor with the smallest measurement noise variance. This is clearly true as demonstrated in
Fig. 2, where allocating all the power to sensor 1 causes the maximum estimation MSE. In Fig.
95 100 105 110
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 x 10
4
Iteration Number k
q k
 
 
σb1=0.8a; σb2=0.6a; ρ=0
σb1=0.7a; σb2=0.7a; ρ=0
σb1=a; σb2=0; ρ=0
Fig. 2. The normalized MSE when independent biases are used. σ2b1 + σ
2
b2
= a2 for each case.
Fig. 3. The normalized MSE for dependent biases. σ2b1 + σ
2
b2
= a2 for each case.
3, three dependent-noise attack strategies are compared, including the optimal one according
to (37), allocating the power equally among the sensors, and allocating all the power to the
sensor with smallest measurement error variance. It is clear that the optimal solution has the
largest impact on the estimation performance, and it outperforms the best independent-noise
attack strategy significantly.
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B. Systems with Position and Velocity Sensors
We now consider the case where the adversary attacks Kalman filtering system with a vector
sensor observation containing both position and velocity measurements. We first consider a
single-sensor system, and the sensor has a position measurement variance of 3 and a velocity
measurement variance of 4. We set the sum of σ2bp1 and T
2σ2bv1 to be 3000. In this particular
case, w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so the optimal choice is ρbp,bv = 1. Based on Theorem 2, the best
strategy is to set σbp = 52.3 and σbv = 16.2. It is clear from Fig. 4 that the strategy provided in
Theorem 2 maximizes the MSE of Kalman filter system by injecting vector bias information.
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v
=16.2; ρb
p
, b
v
=1
σb
p
=38.7; σb
v
=38.7; ρb
p
, b
v
=1
σb
p
=54.8; σb
v
=0; ρb
p
, b
v
=0
Fig. 4. The normalized MSE for a system with a single sensors. σ2p1 + T
2σ2v1 = a
2 for each case.
Next we consider a system with two sensors. The first sensor is the same as the one described
above, and the second one is with position measurement variance 4 and velocity measurement
variance 5. In this particular case, again we have w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so all the ρs in s1, s2,
and s3 should be set as 1. We first use a systematic grid search to find an approximate globally
optimal solution and then we use the FMINCON function in Matlab, a local search algorithm,
to refine this approximate globally optimal solution. The optimal solution we have obtained is
σ2bp1 = 1826, σ
2
bp2
= 1023, σ2bv1 = 81, σ
2
bv2
= 68. For comparison purpose, we also implement
an attack strategy that allocate power equally among the observation components and among
the two sensors, which is σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
= σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750. The simulation result is shown in
Fig. 5. As we can see, the optimal attack strategy has a much greater impact than the one that
allocates power equally. Based on the optimal solution, we can find that allocating more power
to the measurement with lower variance will have a greater effect on Kalman filter system.
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Fig. 5. The normalized MSE for a system with two sensors. σ2p1 + σ
2
p2
+ T 2σ2v1 + T
2σ2v2 = a
2 for each case.
C. Determinant case
Numerical results are presented in this section to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack strategies. Assuming that the injected bias noise bk is zero-mean and Gaussian distributed,
we can show that the posterior probability density function (PDF) of the target state conditioned
on the past observations and the current corrupted observation is
p(xK |z1:K−1, z
′
K) = N (xˆK|K,PK|K +AK) (98)
where xˆK|K is the updated state estimate calculated by Kalman filter, which is unaware of the
presence of the injected false information. Then the target state xK will be in the following
confidence region (or error ellipse)
{
x : (x− xˆK|K)
T (PK|K +AK)
−1(x− xˆK|K) ≤ γ
}
(99)
with probability determined by the threshold γ [23]. The volume of the confidence region defined
by (99) corresponding to the threshold γ is
V (K) = cnx|γ(PK|K +AK)|
1/2 (100)
where nx is the dimension of the target state x,
cn =
pin/2
Γ(n/2 + 1)
(101)
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and Γ(·) is the gamma function. First, let us consider a single-sensor case, where the sensor has a
position measurement with noise variance of 3, which is independent of the velocity measurement
with noise variance of 4. We set the bias noise power constraint as σ2bp+T
2σ2bv = 3000. We solve
the optimization problem formulated in Section ?? numerically, and the optimal solution to (71)
is σ2bp = 1500, σ
2
bv
= 1500, ρbp,v = 0.063. In Fig. 6, error ellipsis for different attack strategies are
plotted. For all the different attack strategies, we set ρbp,v = 0.063. As we can see, under normal
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Fig. 6. Error ellipsis for different power allocation strategies
condition without false information injection, the error ellipse has the smallest area, while the
optimal attack strategy leads to an error ellipse with the largest area. In Figs. 7 and 8, the volume
(area) of the error ellipse is provided as a function of ρbp,v and the ratio κ =
σbp
σbvT
. We can see
that when the κ =
σbp
σbvT
= 1, the area of the ellipse is maximized. Also from Figs. 7 and 8, it is
clear that the area of ellipse increases as the absolute value of ρ decreases. In Fig. 9, the trend
of the error ellipsis as the ρ changes from −1 to +1 is illustrated.
In this particular case, since σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = 3000, ΣK is large and in (71) the second term
(WKΣKW
T
K) dominates. Therefore, in (76) the identity matrix in the objective function is
relatively small comparing to the second item, and approximately we have∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
≈ |ΣK |
∣∣∣WTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (102)
The second term in the second line of the above equation is a constant. Hence, in order to
get the maximum determinant, we should set σ2bp = σ
2
bv
T 2 and ρbp,bv = 0. This is almost the
same solution as we have obtained numerically. Next we consider a system with two sensors.
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The first sensor is the same as the one described above, and the second one is with position
measurement variance 4 and velocity measurement variance 5. To solve the optimization problem
formulated in (96), we first use a systematic grid search to find an approximate globally optimal
solution and then we use the FMINCON function in Matlab, a local search algorithm, to refine
this approximate globally optimal solution. The optimal solution we have obtained is σ2bp1 =
1100, σ2bp2 = 600, σ
2
bv1
= 750, σ2bv2 = 550, ρbp1,p2 = 0.99, ρbp1,v1 = −0.83, ρbp1,v2 =
0.75, ρbv1,p2 = 0.89, ρbp2,v2 = −0.23, ρbv1,v2 = 0.95. For comparison purpose, we introduce
three sub-optimal attack strategies: Strategy I with all the ρs being 0s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
=
600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; Strategy II with all the ρs being 1s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
=
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Fig. 9. Error ellipsis for different ρs
600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; and Strategy II with the ρs being the same as those for the optimal
strategy, and σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
= σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750. The numerical results are shown in Fig. 10.
As we can see, the optimal attack strategy has a greater impact than those sub-optimal attack
strategies, resulting in the largest error ellipse.
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Fig. 10. Error ellipsis for different power allocation strategies
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we derived the EMSE due to the injected random biases for a Kalman filter in
a linear dynamic system. This allows us to find how to allocate the bias power among multiple
sensors in order to maximize the effect of the false information on Kalman filter from two
perspectives: trace and determinant. A concrete example of multi-sensor target tracking system
has been provided. In this example, we investigated both the case where the sensors provide
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position measurements and the case where they collect both position and velocity measurements.
Further, many closed-form results have been provided for the optimal attack strategies. In the
future, we will use game theory and hypothesis testing techniques to characterize the model in
order to have a better understanding of the false information attacks and Kalman filter defense
against such attacks.
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